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Abstract
Firms devising green investment strategies within a deregulated environment must take into
account not only economic and technological uncertainty, but also strategic interactions due to
competition. Also, further complicating green investment decisions is the fact that firms are
likely to exhibit risk aversion, since alternative energy technologies entail risk that cannot be
diversified. Therefore, we develop a utility-based, real options framework for pre-emptive and
non-pre-emptive competition in order to analyse how economic and technological uncertainty
interact with risk aversion to impact the adoption of an existing technology in the light of
uncertainty over the arrival of an improved version. We confirm that greater risk aversion delays
investment and show that technological uncertainty accelerates the follower’s entry, delays the
entry of the pre-emptive leader, and, intriguingly, does not affect the non-pre-emptive leader’s
investment decision. Also, we show how the relative loss in the leader’s value due to the
follower’s entry is affected by economic and technological uncertainty as well as risk aversion,
and how the risk of pre-emption under increasing economic uncertainty raises the value of direct
investment in the new technology relative to stepwise investment.
Keywords: Competition, sequential investment, technological uncertainty, risk aversion, real
options
1. Introduction
In the light of pressing climate change concerns, stringent environmental regulations and the
growing demand for energy-efficient technologies have incentivised private firms to switch to
green energy technologies and intensify research and development (R&D) activities. However,
within a deregulated environment, such capital intensive decisions entail considerable risk, since
their efficiency is subject to market forces. Indeed, firms investing in deregulated domains must
deal with the likely presence of a rival and the loss in market share it entails, while being exposed
to an increasingly volatile economic environment and a greater rate of technological innovation
(Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988; Zachary et al., 2015). For example, General Electric (GE), a
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company whose traditional business is making equipment for gas-fired power plants, now faces
a weaker demand due to the shift towards renewable energy (RE). Therefore, to rebuild its
earnings, GE is now not only expanding in the offshore wind market, but is also engaging with
R&D of new wind turbines in order to capture market share over its rivals (Financial Times,
2018). Similarly, in the UK, Scottish Power has become the first among the big six major UK
energy firms to completely drop fossil fuels in favour of wind power (Independent, 2018).
Apart from RE power plants, other areas where green energy technologies play a critical role
in fostering strategic interactions include energy storage and transportation. For example, in
the area of electric vehicles, technology pioneer Tesla Motors announced in 2014 that it would
make several hundreds of approved patents available to competitors at no cost (The Wall Street
Journal, 2014). This is expected to accelerate innovation, increase the market of electric vehicles
relative to those based on fossil fuel and promote a more competitive environment, whereby
firms may take advantage of other firms’ patented technologies. Indeed, some experts claim
that “open innovation” might be one of the reasons behind fewer patents being filed in 2014
(Financial Times, 2015). Also, in the area of energy storage, the announcement that Tesla won a
tender for the installation of the worlds biggest battery storage system in Australia, motivated
a joint venture between Siemens and AES focusing exclusively on battery storage systems
(Financial Tribune, 2017). These examples emphasise the relevance of positive spillovers within
the energy sector and the increasing likelihood that these may give rise to attrition (Billette de
Villemeur et al., 2019).
Additionally, alternative energy technologies typically entail risk that cannot be diversified,
and, therefore, firms are likely to exhibit risk aversion. Indeed, the underlying commodities
of green energy projects and within the R&D sector of the economy are typically not freely
traded, thus preventing risk-neutral valuation as the assumption of hedging via spanning assets
breaks down. Therefore, in this article, we aim to address the following open research questions:
i. How do sequential opportunities to adopt improved technology versions impact the optimal
technology adoption strategy under duopolistic competition and risk aversion? ii. Is the impact
of technological uncertainty on the optimal investment policy under duopolistic competition
significantly different compared to the benchmark case of monopoly? iii. How do first-mover
advantages interact with risk aversion to impact the optimal technology adoption strategy and
the associated investment rule? These are critical open research questions that are pertinent
to sectors of crucial importance to society and economy, as they underlie complex structural
transformations, such as the transition to low-carbon energy systems.
In this paper, we consider a stylised duopolistic competition, where two identical firms
compete in the sequential adoption of green energy technologies facing price and technological
2
         
uncertainty. Within this context, we analyse the case of non-pre-emptive (proprietary) and
pre-emptive (non-proprietary) competition. For example, in the former case, a firm may have
its own R&D program, and, thus, proprietary rights over the innovations it develops, whereas in
the latter case the innovation process is exogenous to both firms. Additionally, non-pre-emptive
competition may also arise when a particular technology receives governmental support, which
gives it a competitive advantage over less favoured ones (The Guardian, 2018), while vertical
integration may also increase a firm’s strategic advantage and reduce the risk of pre-emption
(Lazzarini, 2015). Hence, the contribution of our work is threefold. First, we develop a utility-
based framework in order to analyse how price and technological uncertainty interact with risk
aversion to impact sequential investment decisions under duopolistic competition. Second, we
derive analytical results, where possible, for the optimal technology adoption strategy and the
associated investment rule of the leader and the follower. Third, we provide managerial insights
for sequential investment under rivalry and uncertainty based on analytical and numerical
results.
We proceed by discussing some related work in Section 2 and introduce assumptions and
notation in Section 3. Section 4 presents the benchmark case of monopoly, which is then ex-
tended in Section 5 by considering two firms that adopt each technology that becomes available
(compulsive strategy) under non-pre-emptive (Sections 5.1) and pre-emptive duopoly (Section
5.2). In Section 6, we also consider how pre-emption of the existing technology may increase
a second-mover’s incentive to adopt the new technology directly (leapfrog strategy). Section
7 presents numerical examples for each case, while Section 8 concludes the article and offers
directions for further research.
2. Related Work
Although traditional real options models address the problem of optimal investment under
uncertainty without considering strategic interactions (McDonald & Siegel, 1985 and 1986; He
& Pindyck, 1992; Malchow-Møller & Thorsen, 2005), the game-theoretic real options literature
has increased over the last years considerably. Nevertheless, models that analyse the impact
of strategic interactions on investment decisions typically ignore either the sequential nature
of investment opportunities and the different strategies they entail (Pawlina & Kort, 2006;
Siddiqui & Takashima, 2012) or attitudes towards risk (Huisman & Kort, 2015).
Examples of early work in the area of competition include Spatt & Sterbenz (1985), who
analyse how the degree of rivalry impacts the learning process and the decision to invest.
They find that increasing the number of players hastens investment and that the investment
decision resembles the standard net present value (NPV) rule. Also, via a deterministic model
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of duopolistic competition, Fudenberg & Tirole (1985) show that a high first-mover advantage
results in a pre-emption equilibrium with dispersed adoption timings by increasing a firm’s
incentive to pre-empt investment by its rival. Extensions of this deterministic framework are
presented in Smets (1993), who develops the first continuous-time model of strategic real options
allowing for product market competition and stochastic demand, and in Huisman & Kort
(1999), who allow for economic uncertainty. The latter find that, in deterministic models, a
high first-mover advantage leads to a pre-emption equilibrium, yet, in stochastic models, higher
uncertainty may turn a pre-emption into a simultaneous investment equilibrium.
Other examples of traditional game-theoretic real options models include Murto (2004),
who analyses the decision to exit a declining market under duopolistic competition. He shows
that a unique equilibrium exists when uncertainty is low or the asymmetry between firms is
sufficiently high, and that a firm with a cost disadvantage is likely to exit earlier because the rival
can credibly commit to stay in the market longer. By developing a two-factor, non-pre-emptive
duopoly model, Paxson & Pinto (2005) find that the leader invests in the same threshold as
the monopolist, and that increasing the correlation between profits per unit and quantity of
units produced raises their aggregate volatility, and, in turn, the investment trigger of both the
leader and the follower. Also, a framework for asymmetric competition under uncertainty is
presented in Takashima et al. (2008), who show how mothballing options facilitate investment
and offer a competitive advantage to a thermal over a nuclear power plant.
A generalisation of the pre-emptive duopoly model is presented in Bouis et al. (2009), who
develop a n−firm oligopoly model and show how greater uncertainty has an accordion effect on
the firms’ investment decision. In the special case involving three firms, they find that if the
entry of the third firm is delayed, then the second firm has an incentive to invest earlier so that
it can enjoy the duopoly market structure for a longer time. This increases the incentive for
the first firm to delay investment, as it faces a shorter period in which it can enjoy monopoly
profits. Interestingly, Mason & Weeds (2010) allow for uncertain returns in a dynamic duopoly
model and find that the investment trigger of a leader under pre-emptive competition is not
only bounded above as uncertainty increases, but also that greater uncertainty may in fact
accelerate investment. In the same line of work, Armada et al. (2011) assume that competitors
arrive according to a Poisson process and Thijssen et al. (2012) present an analytical model
that deals with the coordination problem in pre-emptive competition. Also, Lavrutich et al.
(2017) develop a duopolistic pre-emption model in which they show how the presence of a hidden
competitor, who can appear suddenly and capture part of the market, increases a follower’s
investment incentive in order to avoid being squeezed out of the market. More recently, a model
of imperfect competition under uncertainty is presented in Billette de Villemeur et al. (2019),
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who study the exercise of strategic growth options by two initially identical firms. The novelty
of this work is to characterize the impact of the relative costs of innovation and imitation on
the investment strategies of firms and to explore the regulator’s choice of optimal intellectual
property rights levels. Like in our paper, they analyse how strategic interactions may arise
when innovation has positive spillovers for an imitator (follower), however, risk preferences and
sequential decision making are not considered.
Although the aforementioned literature offers crucial insights on strategic investment under
uncertainty, it is developed under the assumption of risk neutrality. However, the rapid growth
of the R&D-based sector of the economy and the associated market incompleteness implies
that insights reflecting a risk-neutral setting may not carry over to a risk-averse paradigm. For
example, Alvarez & Stenbacka (2004) develop a utility-based framework for optimal regime
switching and show that if the decision-maker is risk seeking, then increasing price uncertainty
does not necessarily decelerate investment. A similar result is indicated in Henderson (2007),
who shows that idiosyncratic risk raises the incentive to accelerate investment and lock in
the investment payoff. By contrast, Hugonnier & Morellec (2013) determine the analytical
expression for the expected utility of a perpetual stream of cash flows that follows a geometric
Brownian motion, and find that greater risk aversion lowers the expected utility of a project
and reduces the probability of investment. However, Chronopoulos et al. (2011) show that
operational flexibility mitigates the impact of risk aversion by increasing the expected utility of
a project. Also, Leippold & Stromberg (2017) extend Huisman & Kort (2004) by allowing for
market incompleteness and find that undiversifiable risk may accelerate technology adoption.
Further complicating the ambiguous impact of risk aversion on optimal investment under
uncertainty is the random arrival of innovations that motivate different technology adoption
strategies. Grenadier & Weiss (1997) model sequential investment in technological innovations
assuming that a risk-neutral firm may either adopt each technology that becomes available
(compulsive), or wait for a new technology to arrive before adopting either the new (leapfrog)
or the old technology (laggard), or purchase only an early innovation (buy and hold). They find
that a firm may adopt an available technology despite the likely arrival of valuable innovations,
whereas decisions on technology adoption are path dependent. Also, Farzin et al. (1998)
investigate the impact of technological uncertainty on the optimal timing of technology adoption
under risk neutrality, yet ignore price uncertainty. The framework of Farzin et al. (1998) is
revisited by Doraszelski (2001), who shows that, compared to the NPV approach, a firm will
defer technology adoption when it takes the option value of waiting into account. Weeds (1999)
analyses the decision to invest in a research project and finds that increasing technological
uncertainty postpones investment and accelerates abandonment when the profitability of the
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project declines. Additionally, Chronopoulos & Siddiqui (2015) find that uncertainty over the
arrival of innovations accelerates technology adoption, and Lukas et al. (2017) show how optimal
capacity is related to a product’s life cycle when technological lifetime is uncertain.
Game-theoretic, real options models that account for technological uncertainty include
Weeds (2002), who analyses strategic investment in competing research projects and identi-
fies the existence of non-cooperative and cooperative games. The former involves a pre-emptive
competition, where firms invest sequentially, and a symmetric outcome in which investment
is more delayed than in the case of monopoly. The latter involves sequential investment, yet
compared to the non-cooperative game, the investment triggers are higher. Also, compared
to the optimal cooperative investment pattern, investment is found to be more delayed when
firms act non-cooperatively, as each refrains from investing in fear of starting a patent race.
Miltersen & Schwartz (2004) analyse how competition in product development impacts invest-
ment in R&D, and find that competition not only increases production and reduces prices, but
also shortens the development stage and raises the probability of a successful outcome. Huis-
man & Kort (2004) study a dynamic duopoly in which firms compete in the adoption of new
technologies and find that the likely arrival of a new technology could turn a pre-emption game
into one where the second mover gets the highest payoff. Alternatively, a follower may benefit
from knowledge spillover as in Femminis & Martini (2011), who find that even for low levels of
spillover, the follower invests as soon as she attains the cost benefit.
More pertinent to our work is the non-pre-emptive duopoly model of Siddiqui & Takashima
(2012), who analyse the extent to which sequential decision making offsets the impact of com-
petition under risk neutrality. They find that a duopoly firm’s value relative to a monopolist’s
decreases with uncertainty as long as the loss in market share is high, and show that this loss
in value decreases if a firm adopts a sequential investment approach. Similarly, we consider a
spillover-knowledge duopoly in which firms compete in the sequential adoption of two technolo-
gies. However, unlike Siddiqui & Takashima (2012), we also consider the optimal investment
strategy of each firm under pre-emptive competition and allow for technological uncertainty,
in terms of the arrival of a new, more improved technology version. Additionally, we relax the
assumption of risk neutrality, and, thus, we analyse how risk aversion interacts with price and
technological uncertainty to affect the technology adoption strategy of each firm.
With respect to the existing technology, we show that the likely arrival of an innovation
has a non-monotonic impact on the entry threshold of the follower, delays the entry of the pre-
emptive leader, but, intriguingly, does not affect the non-pre-emptive leader’s entry threshold.
Additionally, we show how the non-pre-emptive leader’s investment threshold for the second
technology is lower than that of the monopolist. Furthermore, we find that the embedded option
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to adopt an improved technology version decreases the leader’s relative loss in value due to the
presence of a rival. Also, increasing price uncertainty and risk aversion raise the incentive to
delay investment, yet have an ambiguous impact on the relative loss in the value of the leader.
Finally, we find that pre-emption of the first technology by one firm could make direct adoption
of the second one more attractive for the other relative to stepwise investment. Hence, like Kort
et al. (2010), we show that the value of stepwise investment decreases with greater uncertainty,
even though we do not assume that stepwise investment requires an investment cost premium.
3. Assumptions and Notation
We assume that the firms compete in the sequential adoption of two technologies, denoted by
i = 1, 2, of which the first is available whereas the second has not arrived yet. Technological
uncertainty is introduced by assuming that the time of arrival, ν, of the second, improved
technology version follows an exponential distribution with parameter λ, i.e. ν ∼ exp(λ).
Both technologies have an infinite lifetime and no operating cost, while the investment cost is
Ii (I1 ≤ I2). Also, we assume that the electricity price process {Et, t ≥ 0} follows a geometric
Brownian motion (GBM), as in (1), where µ is the annual growth rate, σ is the annual volatility
and dZt is the increment of the standard Brownian motion. The subjective discount rate is
denoted by ρ > µ 1, while r > 0 is the risk-free rate. While a different stochastic process may be
applied, a GBM is often utilised in the real options literature due to the analytical tractability
it provides. Additionally, with respect to the energy sector, Pindyck (1999) surveys 127 years
of data and finds that although energy prices are mean reverting, their rate of mean reversion
is low enough that assuming GBM for investment analysis is unlikely to lead to large errors.
dEt = µEtdt+ σEtdZt, E0 ≡ E > 0 (1)
Note that in the case of pre-emptive competition the innovation process is assumed to be
exogenous to both firms, which is reflected in the independence between price and technological
uncertainty. For ease of exposition we maintain the same assumption under non-pre-emptive
competition. The dependence between ν and {Et, t ≥ 0} and its implications for duopolistic
competition is outside the scope of the paper and is left for future work.
Each firm’s risk preferences are described by a hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA)
utility function, as indicated in (2), where γ is the risk aversion parameter. Risk aversion occurs
for γ < 1 and a lower γ implies greater risk aversion. However, note that this framework can
1The assumption of risk neutrality is common within the context of corporate finance, yet relies on market
completeness. Hence, in the area of green investment, this assumption may not be particularly relevant due to
lack of hedging instruments. In turn, this motivates the use of an exogenously defined (subjective) discount rate.
7
         
accommodate a wide range of utility functions, such as constant absolute risk aversion (CARA)
and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions. The specific choice of utility
function serves the purpose of enabling comparisons with earlier literature (Henderson, 2007;
Hugonnier & Morellec, 2013; Chronopoulos et al., 2014 and Chronopoulos & Lumbreras, 2017).
U(E) =
E
γ
γ
, γ > 0 (2)
We let b = m, `, f denote the monopolist, the leader and the follower, respectively, where the
leader is the first firm to enter the market under duopolistic competition, and, if b = `, then
a = p, n denotes the non-pre-emptive (proprietary) and pre-emptive (non-proprietary) leader,
respectively. The profitability coefficient for each technology is denoted by Di, where Di or Di
indicates that there is either one (i) or two
(
i
)
firms in the market, respectively. Hence, Di is
decreasing in the number of active firms and increasing in i. Intuitively, profits are higher for
the leader in the absence of a follower, as in Billette de Villemeur et al. (2019), i.e:
D1 > D1
∧ ∧ (3)
D2 > D2
Depending on the number of firms in the industry, a firm’s option to invest in technology i
while operating technology i− 1 is denoted by F abi−1,i(·), and the expected utility from operat-
ing technology i inclusive of embedded options is denoted by Φabi (·). Also, the optimal time
of investment and the corresponding optimal investment threshold are denoted by τabi−1,i and
εabi−1,i, respectively. For example, F
n`
0,1(·) is the pre-emptive leader’s option to invest in the first
technology with a single embedded option to adopt the second one, while τn`0,1 and ε
n`
0,1 are the
corresponding optimal time of investment and optimal investment threshold, respectively.
To facilitate the exposition of the results, our work is based on a set of research questions
in the form of testable hypotheses that are outlined below and illustrated in Figure 1. The
hypotheses are based on the assumption that the new technology produces greater output
than the existing one, yet is more capital intensive. In terms of context, a firm may hold an
investment opportunity to develop a production facility in two steps. First, it develops the
production facility and then it exercises the option to retrofit it with a new technology. For
example, oil production facilities have been converted to utilise gas reserves but at a substantial
cost in order to implement export facilities and retrofitting (Støre et al., 2018).
– Hypothesis 1: The non-pre-emptive leader cannot adopt the new technology before the
follower invests in the existing one, i.e. εp`
1,2
> εf
0,1
, because the new technology is more
capital intensive (left panel).
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– Hypothesis 2: The loss in the non-pre-emptive leaders’ option value due to the follower’s
entry increases the leader’s incentive to accelerate investment in the new technology rela-
tive to the case of monopoly, i.e. εp`
1,2
< εm1,2 (left panel).
– Hypothesis 3: Competition induces myopic behaviour. Specifically, sharing the existing
technology before the leader adopts the new one (Hypothesis 1) lowers monopoly profits,
thereby mitigating the impact of a higher innovation in terms of accelerating investment.
– Hypothesis 4: Loss of first-mover advantage may motivate a firm to skip the existing
technology and invest in the new one directly. The relative value of this strategy may
increase when i. the output price is high; ii. major price changes are more likely; or iii.
when risk aversion is low, i.e. when γ is high (right panel).
εf
0,1
εp`
1,2
εm1,2
In
ve
st
m
en
t
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Risk Aversion ↑
(γ < 1)
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1
Price/Technological Uncertainty
γ2
γ1
γ1
γ2 γ2 < γ1
E ↑
1
Figure 1: Optimal investment thresholds (left panel) and relative value of skipping the first technology (right
panel).
4. Benchmark Case: Single Investment under Monopoly
First, we consider the benchmark case where a monopolist holds a single investment opportunity
and faces only price uncertainty. This has already been analysed in Hugonnier & Morellec (2013)
and Conejo et al. (2016), but we present the analysis here for ease of exposition and to allow
for comparisons. In terms of notation, since there is a single firm in the market, we set b = m
and we also suppress the first index, a, as it is not relevant in the absence of competition. Also,
because the monopolist holds a single investment opportunity, we can relax the notation by
ignoring the subscripts indicating investment in the first or the second technology. Thus, the
option to invest F abi−1,i(·) becomes Fm(·) and τabi−1,i becomes τm. Similarly, we set I1 ≡ I and
D1 ≡ D. Because the utility function U(·) is not separable, the key insight is to decompose all
the cash flows of the project into disjoint time intervals. Hence, we assume that the monopolist
has initially placed the amount of capital required for investment in a certificate of deposit and
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earns a risk-free rate, r. Thus, until time τm, the monopolist earns the instantaneous utility
U(rI). At time τm, the monopolist swaps this risk-free cash flow in return for the instantaneous
utility U(ED), as shown in Figure 2.∫ τm
0
e−ρtU (rI) dt
0 τm
∫ ∞
τm
e−ρtU (EtD) dt
t
Figure 2: Irreversible investment under monopoly.
The time-zero expected discounted utility of all the cash flows of the project is described in
(4), where EE [·] denotes the expectation operator conditional on the initial output price, E.
EE
[∫ τm
0
e−ρtU (rI) dt+
∫ ∞
τm
e−ρtU (EtD) dt
]
(4)
By decomposing the first integral, we can rewrite (4) as in (5).∫ ∞
0
e−ρtU (rI) dt+ EE
[∫ ∞
τm
e−ρt [U (EtD)− U (rI)] dt
]
(5)
Notice that the first term in (5) is deterministic, as it does not depend on the investment
threshold. Therefore, the optimisation objective is reflected in the second term and is expressed
as an optimal stopping-time problem in (6) using the law of iterated expectations and the strong
Markov property of the GBM. The latter states that the values of the process {Et, t ≥ 0} after
time τm are independent of the values of the process before time τm and depend only on the
value of the process at time τm. The objective is to determine the first passage time of the
price process through the critical threshold τm that is defined as τm = inf {t ≥ 0 : Et ≥ εm}.
Fm (E) = sup
τm∈S
EE
[
e−ρτ
m
Eεm
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρt [U (EtD)− U (rI)] dt
]]
(6)
Thus, (6) is the discounted (to time t = 0) expected utility of cash flows from a power plant
that becomes active at τm and operates forever. Note that the inner conditional expectation’s
independence from E means that the two expectations may be separated as follows:
Fm (E) = sup
τm∈S
EE
[
e−ρτ
m]
Eεm
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρt [U (EtD)− U (rI)] dt
]
(7)
Also, the stochastic discount factor is EE
[
e−ρτm
]
=
(
E
εm
)β1
(Dixit & Pindyck, 1994 p. 315),
β1 > 1, β2 < 0 are the roots of the quadratic
1
2σ
2β(β − 1) + µβ − ρ = 0 and S is the set of
stopping times generated by the filtration of the process {Et, t ≥ 0}. Using Theorem 9.18 of
Karatzas & Shreve (1999), we can express the expected utility of a perpetual stream of cash
flows that follows a GBM as in (8).
EE
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtU (EtD) = ΥU (ED) , where Υ =
β1β2
ρ(β1 − γ)(β2 − γ) (8)
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By inserting the expression for the stochastic discount factor, we can now recast the optimal
stopping-time problem in (7) as the following unconstrained nonlinear maximization problem:
Fm (E) = max
εm>E
(
E
εm
)β1
Φm (εm) (9)
where Φm (E) = ΥU (ED) − 1ρU (rI) is the expected utility of the active project. Solving
the unconstrained optimisation problem (9), we obtain the optimal investment threshold that
is indicated in (10). Note that, although the investment threshold is commonly expressed in
terms of β1, it is more expedient to use β2 in our case, due to the relationship β1β2 = −2ρ / σ2.
Additionally, the second-order sufficiency condition requires the objective function to be concave
at εm, which is shown in Chronopoulos & Lumbreras (2017). Also, note that the analysis of
sequential technology adoption for the monopolist is identical to the follower’s (see Section 5.1),
except for replacing Di by Di to indicate the absence of competition.
εm = rI
[
β2 − γ
β2Dγ
] 1
γ
(10)
From the existing literature (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; Hugonnier & Morellec, 2013), we know
that, in the benchmark case, increasing price uncertainty and risk aversion delay investment
by raising the associated opportunity cost and decreasing the expected utility of the active
project, respectively. However, the benchmark case does not allow for strategic interactions
or sequential investment opportunities that may be subject to technological uncertainty. Con-
sequently, crucial aspects that could impact an investment decision substantially are ignored.
For example, uncertainty over the arrival of innovations accelerates investment by raising the
incentive to adopt an existing technology (Chronopoulos & Siddiqui, 2015). Furthermore, the
presence of a rival may also induce earlier investment due to the risk of pre-emption (Huisman
& Kort, 1999). These features introduce opposing forces that are overlooked in the benchmark
case and will be addressed in the following sections.
5. Compulsive Strategy
5.1. Non-pre-emptive Duopoly
Follower
We extend Section 4 by assuming that there are two firms in the market competing in the
sequential adoption of technological innovations. First, we consider the optimal investment
policy of the follower, who makes transitions between states (i − 1, i) and i, i = 1, 2. Note
that the corresponding value functions and critical thresholds for a single firm under sequential
investment and risk neutrality can be obtained by replacing Di with Di and setting γ = 1
(Chronopoulos & Siddiqui, 2015). Also, since the follower will adopt each technology after the
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leader, we can relax the notation by indicating the presence of two firms via i only when it is
necessary to avoid confusion, i.e. when it is not implied by the superscript. For example, εf
0,1
reduces to εf0,1.
As indicated in Figure 3, the follower is initially in state (0, 1) and holds the option to invest
in the first technology. Upon investing at εf0,1, the follower moves to state 1. Subsequently,
once an innovation takes place, the follower moves to state (1, 2), where she has the option to
invest in the second technology. The option is exercised at εf1,2 and the follower moves to state
2. We denote a transition due to an innovation (investment) by a dashed (solid) line.
0,1 1 1,2 2
εf0,1 λ ε
f
1,2
Figure 3: State-transition diagram for the non-pre-emptive follower under a compulsive strategy.
Although we do not consider the choice between the two technologies2 (De´camps et al.,
2006), the feasibility of a compulsive strategy requires a trade-off between the two technologies
so that they both present viable investment opportunities for different price ranges, as indicated
in Proposition 1. Formally, this trade-off implies that: i. there exists an E∗ > 0 such that
Φpb1 (E) > Φ
pb
2 (E) for E < E
∗ and Φpb1 (E) < Φ
pb
2 (E) for E > E
∗, so that the NPVs of the two
technologies intersect at some E∗ > 0; and ii. the NPV at the point of intersection between the
expected NPVs of the two technologies needs to be positive. Otherwise, only the new technology
presents a viable investment opportunity. Note that the condition presented in Proposition 1 is
a more general version of that in Chronopoulos & Siddiqui (2015), as it relaxes the assumption
of risk neutrality (all proofs can be found in the appendix).
Proposition 1. A trade-off between the two technologies exists if the first (second) technology
is preferred for low (high) output prices and requires that
Dγ1
Iγ1
>
Dγ2
Iγ1 +I
γ
2
.
Like in Section 4, the amount of capital required for the adoption of each technology is
exchanged at investment for the risky cash flows of the project. To illustrate the decomposition
of the cash flows under sequential investment and within a utility-based framework, we assume
in Figure 4 that the second technology is available. Thus, at time τf0,1 the follower borrows
that the capital required for investing in the first technology and exchanges it for the risky
cash flows it generates. Analogously to (5) and (6), this results in the instantaneous utility
U (ED1)− U (rI1), which accrues from τf0,1 until τf1,2. Similarly, at τf1,2 the follower exchanges
the capital required for investing in the second technology for the risky cash flows it generates.
2Apart from a compulsive strategy, it is possible for the follower to wait for both technologies to become
available before deciding to invest in either the older (laggard strategy) or the newer version (leapfrog strategy).
These strategies have been analysed in Grenadier & Weiss (1997) and Chronopoulos & Siddiqui (2015).
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The representation and decomposition of the cash-flows in Figure 4 facilitates the treatment of
the investment cost within a utility-based framework, where the utility function is not separable,
i.e. U(rI1 +rI2) 6= U(rI1)+U(rI2). In addition, this representation is in line with technological
uncertainty and accounts for the case λ = 0. Hence, the firm does not hold the entire capital
required for both investments in a security of deposit from the very beginning, since the arrival
of the second technology is uncertain.
waiting
region
0 τf0,1 τ
f
1,2
∫ τf1,2
τ
f
0,1
e−ρt [U (EtD1)− U (rI1)] dt
∫ ∞
τ
f
1,2
e−ρt [U (EtD2)− U (rI1)− U (rI2)] dt
t
Figure 4: Sequential investment under a compulsive strategy.
The follower’s objective is to maximise the time-zero discounted expected utility of all the cash
flows of the project. Building on Figure 4, the follower’s optimisation objective is described in
(11) as an optimal stopping-time problem, where we assume that τf0,1 < ν < τ
f
1,2 to indicate
that the improved technology version arrives after the first one is adopted. The first (second)
integral in (11) indicates the expected utility of the cash flows from operating the first (second)
technology.
sup
τ
f
0,1∈S
τ
f
1,2>ν>τ
f
0,1
EE
[∫ τf1,2
τ
f
0,1
e−ρt [U (EtD1)− U (rI1)] dt+
∫ ∞
τ
f
1,2
e−ρt [U (EtD2)− U (rI1)− U (rI2)] dt
]
(11)
Following the same approach as in (6) and (7), we decompose the first integral and rewrite (11)
as in (12).
sup
τ
f
0,1∈S
EE
[
e−ρτ
f
0,1
]E
εf0,1
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt [U (EtD1)− U (rI1)] dt+ sup
τ
f
1,2>ν>τ
f
0,1
E
εf0,1
[
e
−ρ
(
τ
f
1,2−τf0,1
)]
×E
εf1,2
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
[(
Dγ
2
−Dγ
1
)
U (Et)− U (rI2)
]
dt
]
(12)
We determine the follower’s value function in each state using backward induction. There-
fore, we first assume that the follower in state 2, i.e. has already adopted and operates the
second technology. The expected utility of the perpetual stream of profits from operating the
second technology is described in (13).
Φf2(E) = EE
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt [U (EtD2)− U (rI1)− U (rI2)] dt = ΥU (ED2)−
U (rI1) + U (rI2)
ρ
(13)
Next, to facilitate the analysis of technological uncertainty, we present the value function and
optimal investment threshold of the follower in state (1, 2) as the solution to a free-boundary
problem. Using the Bellman principle, the follower’s value function is described in (14), where
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the first term in the top part is the utility of the immediate cash flow from operating the first
technology and the second term is the expected utility in the continuation region. The bottom
part is the expected utility of the second technology and is already determined in (13).
F f1,2 (E) =

[U (ED1)− U (rI1)] dt+ e−ρdtEE
[
F f1,2(E + dE)
]
, E < εf1,2
Φf2(E) , E ≥ εf1,2
(14)
By expanding the top part on the right-hand side of (14) using Itoˆ’s lemma we obtain the
ordinary differential equation (ODE) [L − ρ]F f1,2(E) + U (ED1) − U (rI1) = 0, where L =
1
2σ
2E2 d
2
dE2
+ µE ddE is the differential generator. The ODE is solved subject to two boundary
conditions, namely the value-matching and smooth-pasting condition, indicated in (A–12) and
(A–13), respectively, and, thus, we obtain the analytical expression for the value function of the
follower in state (1, 2) and the optimal investment policy, as indicated in Proposition 2. The
first two terms in the top part of (15) represent the expected utility from operating the first
technology and the third term is the option to invest in the second one.
Proposition 2. The value function of the follower in state (1, 2) is
F f1,2(E) =

ΥU (ED1)− U(rI1)ρ +Af1,2Eβ1 , E < εf1,2
Φf2(E) , E ≥ εf1,2
(15)
where the endogenous constant Af1,2 and optimal investment threshold ε
f
1,2 are indicated in (16)
and (17), respectively, and are obtained by applying value-matching and smooth-pasting condi-
tions to the two branches of (15).
Af1,2 =
(
1
εf1,2
)β1 [
Υ
(
Dγ
2
−Dγ
1
)
U
(
εf1,2
)
− U (rI2)
]
(16)
εf1,2 = rI2
 β2 − γ
β2
(
Dγ
2
−Dγ
1
)
 1γ (17)
Alternatively, Af1,2E
β1 can be expressed as in (18), which corresponds to the inner optimal
stopping-time problem of (12).
Af1,2E
β1 = max
εf1,2>E
(
E
εf1,2
)β1
E
εf1,2
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
[(
Dγ
2
−Dγ
1
)
U (Et)− U (rI2)
]
dt
= max
εf1,2>E
(
E
εf1,2
)β1 [
Υ
(
Dγ
2
−Dγ
1
)
U
(
εf1,2
)
− U (rI2)
]
(18)
Also, note that εf1,2 > ε
m
1,2, since the follower’s market share is smaller than the monopolist’s,
which, in turn, raises the incentive to delay investment relative to the monopolist.
εf1,2 = rI2
 β2 − γ
β2
(
Dγ
2
−Dγ
1
)
 1γ > rI2
 β2 − γ
β2
(
Dγ2 −Dγ1
)
 1γ = εm1,2 > εm (19)
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Next, we step back to state 1, where the follower is operating the first technology and
holds an embedded option to invest in the second one, that has yet to become available. The
dynamics of the expected utility of the active project are described in (20), where the first term
on the right-hand side represents the instantaneous utility of the profits from operating the
first technology and the second term is the expected utility of the project in the continuation
region. As the second term indicates, with probability λdt the second technology will arrive
and the follower will receive the value function F f1,2(E), whereas, with probability 1 − λdt, no
innovation will occur and the follower will continue to hold the value function Φf1(E).
Φf1(E) = [U (ED1)− U (rI1)] dt+ e−ρdtEE
[
λdtF f1,2(E + dE) + (1− λdt) Φf1(E + dE)
]
(20)
By expanding the right-hand side of (20) using Itoˆ’s lemma, we obtain (21), where L =
1
2σ
2E2 d
2
dE2
+ µE ddE denotes the differential generator.
[L − (ρ+ λ)] Φf1(E) + λF f1,2(E) + U (D1E)− U (ρI1) = 0 (21)
Next, we solve the ordinary differential equation (ODE) (21) for each expression of F f1,2(E)
indicated in (15) and obtain (22). Note that Λ = ΥλΥ+1 and δ1 > 0, δ2 < 0 are the roots of the
quadratic 12σ
2δ(δ − 1) + µδ − (ρ+ λ) = 0. The first two terms on the top part represent the
expected utility of the revenues and cost, respectively. The third term is the option to invest in
the second technology, adjusted via the last term because the second technology is not available
yet. The first three terms on the bottom part, represent the expected utility of operating the
second technology, and the fourth term represents the likelihood of the price dropping in the
waiting region.
Φf1(E) =

ΥU (ED1)− U(rI1)ρ +Af1,2Eβ1 +Af1Eδ1 , E < εf1,2
Λ [λΥU (ED2) + U (ED1)]− λU(rI2)(λ+ρ)ρ − U(rI1)ρ +Bf1Eδ2 , E ≥ εf1,2
(22)
The endogenous constants Af1 > 0 and B
f
1 < 0, are determined analytically by applying value-
matching and smooth-pasting conditions to the two branches of (22), and are indicated in (23)
and (24), respectively. Note that by setting γ = 1, we can retrieve the risk-neutral version of
Af1 and B
f
1 as in Chronopoulos & Siddiqui (2015).
Af1 =
εf
−δ1
1,2
δ2 − δ1
[
(δ2 − γ)λΛΥU
(
εf1,2
) [
Dγ
2
−Dγ
1
]
+ (β1 − δ2)Af1,2εf
β1
1,2 −
δ2λU (rI2)
ρ (ρ+ λ)
]
(23)
Bf1 =
εf
−δ2
1,2
δ1 − δ2
[
(γ − δ1)λΛΥU
(
εf1,2
) [
Dγ
2
−Dγ
1
]
+ (δ1 − β1)Af1,2εf
β1
1,2 +
δ1λU (rI2)
ρ (ρ+ λ)
]
(24)
Finally, the follower’s value function in state (0, 1) is indicated in (25). By applying value-
matching and smooth-pasting conditions to the two branches of (25), we can solve for the
15
         
optimal investment threshold, εf0,1, and the endogenous constant, A
f
0,1, numerically.
F f0,1(E) =

Af0,1E
β1 , E < εf0,1
Φf1(E) , E ≥ εf0,1
(25)
Leader
Next, we consider the investment policy of the non-pre-emptive leader. Notice that once the
leader invests in the first technology, thus moving from state (0, 1) to state 1, she receives
monopoly profits until the follower enters. This may reflect an industry with weak patent
protection, where knowledge spillover enables the immediate entry of a rival. Once the follower
adopts the first technology, both firms share the market in state 1. Subsequently, the same
process is repeated with respect to the second technology, until, finally, the two firms share the
market in state 2.
0, 1 1 1 1, 2 2 2
εf1,2ε
p`
1,2λε
f
0,1ε
p`
0,1
Figure 5: State-transition diagram for the non-pre-emptive leader under a compulsive strategy.
We start with state 2, and, assuming that the follower chooses the optimal investment policy,
the value function of the non-pre-emptive leader is the same as the follower’s because in state 2
the two firms share the market, i.e. Φp`
2
(E) = Φf2(E). However, before the follower has adopted
the second technology, i.e. for εp`
1,2
< E < εf1,2, the non-pre-emptive leader enjoys monopoly
profits and the expected utility from operating the second technology is indicated in (26).
Φp`2 (E) = EE
[∫ τf1,2
0
[U (EtD2)− U (rI1)− U (rI2)] dt
+
∫ ∞
τ
f
1,2
[
U
(
EtD2
)− U (rI1)− U (rI2)] dt] (26)
By decomposing the first integral in (26), we can express it as in (27)
Φp`2 (E) = EE
[∫ ∞
0
[U (EtD2)− U (rI1)− U (rI2)] dt
+EE
[
e−ρτ
f
1,2
]
E
εf1,2
∫ ∞
0
[
U
(
EtD2
)− U (EtD2)] dt] (27)
and by substituting for the analytical expression of the first integral and for EE
[
e−ρτ
f
1,2
]
we
obtain (28). The first two terms on the right-hand side reflect the monopoly profits from
operating the second technology and the third term is expected reduction in utility due to the
follower’s entry.
Φp`2 (E) = ΥU
(
ED2
)− U (rI1) + U (rI2)
ρ
+
(
E
εf1,2
)β1
ΥU
(
εf1,2
) [
Dγ
2
−Dγ2
]
(28)
16
         
Next, in state
(
1, 2
)
, i.e. before the second technology is adopted, the non-pre-emptive
leader’s value function is described in (29). The first two terms on the top part reflect the
expected utility of the profits from operating the first technology, and the third term is the
embedded option to invest in the second one. The bottom part is the expected utility of the
active project, which is already determined in (28).
F p`
1,2
(E) =

ΥU (ED1)− U(rI1)ρ +Ap`1,2Eβ1 , E < ε
p`
1,2
Φp`2 (E) , E ≥ εp`1,2
(29)
Following the same approach as in Proposition 2, the endogenous constant, Ap`
1,2
, and the optimal
investment threshold, εp`
1,2
, can be obtained analytically via value-matching and smooth-pasting
conditions and are indicated in (30).
εp`
1,2
= rI2
 β2 − γ
β2
(
Dγ2 −Dγ1
)
 1γ and Ap`
1,2
=
(
1
εp`
1,2
)β1[
Φp`2
(
εp`
1,2
)
−ΥU
(
εp`
1,2
D1
)
+ U(rI1)ρ
]
(30)
Using Proposition 1, we find that the non-pre-emptive leader will not invest in the second
technology before the follower adopts the first one. This happens because the second technology
is more costly and can not be adopted when the output price is below the follower’s required
investment threshold for the first technology. Also, unlike the case where a firm holds a single
investment option (Chronopoulos et al., 2014), the leader’s required investment threshold in the
second technology is lower than the corresponding monopoly threshold. Intuitively, the entry of
the follower reduces the leader’s monopoly profits with respect to the first technology. In turn,
this raises the value of the leader’s option to invest in the second technology and lowers the
required adoption threshold, thereby extending the corresponding period of monopoly profits.
Both results as shown in Proposition 3, thus confirming Hypothesis 1&2.
Proposition 3. The non-pre-emptive leader invests in the second technology earlier than the
corresponding monopoly threshold but after the follower invests in the first one, i.e. εf0,1 <
εp`
1,2
< εm1,2.
In state 1, the leader shares the market with the follower waiting for the arrival of the
second technology. Following the same approach as in (20), we derive the ODE that describes
the dynamics of the value function of the leader, which is indicated in (31).
[L − (ρ+ λ)] Φp`
1
(E) + λF p`
1,2
(E) + U (ED1)− U (rI1) = 0 (31)
Like (20), we solve (31) to derive the non-pre-emptive leader’s value function in state 1. This
is indicated in (32), where Ap`
1
and Cp`
1
are determined by value matching and smooth pasting
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the two branches, and Bp`
1
is obtained by value matching (32) with the bottom branch of (22)
at εf1,2. The first two (three) terms in the top (bottom) part of (32) reflect the expected utility
of the profits under a low (high) output price. The third term on the top part is the option to
invest in the second technology adjusted via the fourth term for technological uncertainty. The
fourth term on the bottom part is the reduction in the expected utility of the leader’s profits
due to the follower’s entry adjusted for technological uncertainty via the fifth term. The last
term reflects the likelihood of the price dropping in the waiting region.
Φp`
1
(E) =

ΥU (ED1)− U(rI1)ρ +Ap`1,2Eβ1 +A
p`
1
Eδ1 , E < εp`
1,2
Λ
[
λΥU
(
ED2
)
+ U (ED1¯)
]− U(rI1)ρ − λU(rI2)ρ(ρ+λ)
+Ap`2 E
β1 +Bp`
1
Eδ1 + Cp`
1
Eδ2 , E ≥ εp`
1,2
(32)
The value function of the non-pre-emptive leader in state 1 is indicated in (33) and is
determined following the same approach as in (28). The first two terms on the right-hand side
reflect the expected utility from operating the first technology and the last term is the expected
loss in the non-pre-emptive leader’s profits due to the follower’s entry.
Φp`1 (E) = ΥU
(
ED1
)− U (rI1)
ρ
+
(
E
εf0,1
)β1 [
ΥU
(
εf0,1
) [
Dγ
1
−Dγ1
]
+Ap`
1,2
εf
β1
0,1
+Ap`
1
εf
δ1
0,1
]
, E < εf0,1 (33)
In state (0, 1), the non-pre-emptive leader holds the option to invest in the first technology
with an embedded option to invest in the second one, that has yet to become available. The
expression of F p`0,1(E) is described in (34), where the top part is the value of the option to invest
and the bottom part is the expected utility of the active project inclusive of the embedded
option to invest in the second technology. The expressions of εp`0,1 and A
p`
0,1 are indicated in
(A–21).
F p`0,1(E) =

Ap`0,1E
β1 , E < εp`0,1
Φp`1 (E) , E ≥ εp`0,1
(34)
As shown in Proposition 4, the leader’s decision to adopt the first technology is independent
of technological uncertainty (Hypothesis 3). Intuitively, the leader’s loss in value due to the
follower’s entry creates an opposing force that offsets the leader’s incentive for earlier investment
due to the likely arrival of the second technology.
Proposition 4. Competition induces the non-pre-emptive leader to adopt a myopic technology
adoption strategy.
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5.2. Pre-emptive Duopoly
With two firms in the market fighting for the leader’s position, each one of them faces the
risk of pre-emption. Note that, under a compulsive strategy, the follower will invest in each
technology after the leader has already adopted it. Consequently, the value function of the
follower in each state is the same as in Section 5.1. However, to determine the pre-emptive
leader’s optimal investment policy, starting with the second technology, we must consider the
strategic interactions between the leader and the follower. Note that the leader’s value function
in state 2 is already described in (28), i.e. Φn`2 (E) ≡ Φp`2 (E). Intuitively, if both firms hold a
single investment option (Takashima et al., 2008), then the pre-emption threshold is defined as
the point of intersection between the option value of the follower, F f1,2(E), and the value of the
active project of the leader, Φn`2 (E). Intuitively, if we denote this point by ε
n`
1,2
, then:
i. If E < εn`
1,2
, then a firm is better off being the follower because F f1,2(E) > Φ
n`
2 (E).
ii. If E > εn`
1,2
, then a firm is better off being a leader because F f1,2(E) < Φ
n`
2 (E).
Consequently, the point of indifference between being a leader and a follower, which is indicated
in Figure 6, is determined numerically by solving (35). Formally, the pre-emption threshold is
determined using the subgame perfect equilibrium concept of Riedel & Steg (2017) for timing
stochastic games. If there exists a first mover advantage, then there must be an interval P =(
εn`
1,2
, εf1,2
)
where Φn`2 (E) > F
f
1,2(E) given that E ∈ P. We are searching for the pre-emption
time τn`2 , which is defined as the first hitting time of the interval P, i.e. τn`2 = inf {t ≥ ϕ|Et ∈ P},
where ϕ ∈ C is an admissible stopping time where a subgame between the players is played.3
F f1,2(E) = Φ
n`
2 (E) (35)
However, in the presence of sequential investment options, Proposition 5 indicates that εn`
1,2
is
not necessarily the pre-emption threshold. In fact, to determine the pre-emption threshold we
need to compare εn`
1,2
with the threshold at which the follower will adopt the first technology.
Note that the follower may invest in the first technology either before or after the indifference
threshold of the second one, as shown in Figure 6. If εf0,1 > ε
n`
1,2
, then the leader does not face
the risk of pre-emption, because the follower is assumed here to adopt a compulsive strategy,
and, therefore, will not skip the first technology. However, if the follower adopts the first
technology before the indifference threshold
(
εf0,1 < ε
n`
1,2
)
, then the leader faces the threat of
pre-emption. The shaded area in Figure 6 indicates the output price range within which pre-
emption of the second technology is possible, while, in Proposition 5, we show that the leader’s
3Finally we can rule out coordination failures when the stochastic process is approaching the pre-emption
threshold from below (Thijssen et al., 2012).
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Figure 6: Leader’s investment in the second technology under pre-emptive competition.
optimal investment threshold in the second technology is max
{
εf0,1, ε
n`
1,2
}
. Intuitively, although
the leader can pre-empt the second technology at εn`
1,2
, she may choose to delay adoption until
the follower’s entry at εf0,1, provided that ε
f
0,1 > ε
n`
1,2
. Doing so, the leader captures the same
value function, albeit at a higher threshold, closer to the utility-maximising one.
Proposition 5. The optimal investment threshold of the pre-emptive leader for the second
technology is  = max
{
εf0,1, ε
n`
1,2
}
, where εn`
1,2
satisfies the condition F f1,2 (E) = Φ
n`
2 (E).
Next, we step back, prior to the arrival of the second technology, and assume that, although
the firms were identical in the beginning, pre-emption of the first technology by one of the firms
offers a strategic advantage that enables the same firm to also pre-empt the second one. The
pre-emptive leader’s value function is indicated in (36). The first two terms reflect the expected
utility of the monopoly profits from operating the first technology and the third term reflects
the expected reduction in utility due to the followers entry, where  = max
{
εf0,1, ε
n`
1,2
}
.
Φn`1 (E) = ΥU
(
ED1
)− U (rI1)
ρ
+
(
E

)β1 [
Fn`
1,2
()−ΥU (D1)+ U (rI1)
ρ
]
(36)
Unlike (33), the expected reduction in the value of the leader due to the follower’s entry now
depends on whether the follower invests in the first technology before or after εn`
1,2
. Once the
follower invests in the first technology, the two firms will share the market, but, unlike the
follower, the pre-emptive leader will receive the expected discounted value from pre-empting
the second technology, as indicated in (37). As the top part of (37) indicates, if εf0,1 < ε
n`
1,2
,
then the leader will receive the reduced cash flows from operating the first technology and the
discounted value from pre-empting the second technology at the indifference threshold,  = εn`
1,2
.
Similarly, the bottom part indicates that if εf0,1 ≥ εn`1,2, then upon the follower’s entry the leader
20
         
will pre-empt the second technology immediately, i.e.  = εf0,1.
Fn`
1,2
(E) =

ΥU (ED1)− U(rI1)ρ +
(
E
εn`
1,2
)β1 [
Φp`2
(
εn`
1,2
)
−ΥU (ED1) + U(rI1)ρ
]
, εf0,1 < ε
n`
1,2
Φp`2 (E) , ε
f
0,1 ≥ εn`1,2
(37)
The first term in (38) is the instantaneous utility of the leader’s reduced profits due to
follower’s entry. As the second term indicates, with probability λdt the second technology will
become available and the leader will get to pre-empt it, whereas with probability 1 − λdt the
leader will continue sharing the first technology with the follower.
Φn`
1
(E) = [U (ED1)− U (rI1)] dt+ e−ρdtEE
[
λdtFn`
1,2
(E + dE) + (1− λdt) Φn`
1
(E + dE)
]
(38)
By extending the right-hand side of (38) using Itoˆ’s lemma we obtain the ODE (39), which
must be solved for each expression of Fn`
1,2
(E) indicated in (37).
[L − (ρ+ λ)] Φn`
1
(E) + λFn`
1,2
(E) + U (ED1)− U (rI1) = 0 (39)
Following the same reasoning as in (35), the leader’s pre-emption threshold in the first technol-
ogy, εn`0,1, is determined numerically by solving (40).
F f0,1 (E) = Φ
n`
1 (E) (40)
6. Leapfrog Strategy
The competitive advantage created by ignoring the first technology, and, thus not incurring
the associated investment cost, may motivate the direct adoption of the second one instead of
a compulsive strategy. The game structure we consider in this section is similar to the one
discussed in Section 5.2, except that the follower only considers the second technology. Like
Takashima et al. (2008), we take the perspective of each firm separately and analyse their
value functions assuming that it is possible for each firm to assume both roles, i.e. leader and
follower. Then, we compare the corresponding investment triggers to conclude which role is
feasible for each firm. Having already determined the pre-emption threshold for the second
technology under a compulsive strategy in (35), we will now determine the same pre-emption
threshold under the assumption that the first technology is ignored. We denote as follower
the firm that is pre-empted in the adoption of the first technology, and, therefore, may have a
greater incentive to pre-empt the second technology. The follower’s value function is described
in (41), where the top part is the value of the option to invest and the bottom part is the
expected utility of the active project.
F f0,2(E) =

Af0,2E
β1 , E < εf0,2
ΥU (ED2)− U(rI2)ρ , E ≥ εf0,2
(41)
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Note that Af0,2 and ε
f
0,2 are obtained analytically via value-matching and smooth-pasting con-
ditions and are indicated in (42).
εf0,2 =
rI2
D2
[
β2 − γ
β2
] 1
γ
and Af0,2 =
(
1
εf0,2
)β1 [
ΥU
(
εf0,2D2
)
− U (rI2)
ρ
]
(42)
The corresponding pre-emptive leader’s value function is denoted by Φ˜n`2 (·) and is described
in (43) for ε˜n`0,2 < E ≤ εf0,2. The first term represents the monopoly profits from operating the
second technology and the second term is the loss in expected utility due to the follower’s entry.
Φ˜n`2 (E) = EE
[∫ τf0,2
0
[U (EtD2)− U (rI2)] dt
+EE
[
e−ρτ
f
0,2
]
E
εf0,2
∫ ∞
τ
f
0,2
[
U
(
EtD2
)− U (EtD2)] dt
]
(43)
By decomposing the first integral and substituting for EE
[
e−ρτ
f
0,2
]
we can rewrite (43) as in
(44).
Φ˜n`2 (E) = ΥU
(
ED2
)− U (rI2)
ρ
+
(
E
εf0,2
)β1 [
ΥU
(
εf0,2
)(
Dγ
2
−Dγ2
)]
, ε˜n`0,2 < E ≤ εf0,2 (44)
Note that the point of intersection between F f0,2
(
ε˜n`0,2
)
and Φ˜n`2
(
ε˜n`0,2
)
indicates the point of
indifference between being the leader and the follower, and, thus, the pre-emptive leader’s
threshold, ε˜n`0,2, satisfies the condition F
f
0,2
(
ε˜n`0,2
)
= Φ˜n`2
(
ε˜n`0,2
)
. Hence, skipping the first tech-
nology in order to pre-empt the second one requires that ε˜n`0,2 < ε
n`
1,2
, i.e. that the pre-emption
threshold of the compulsive leader is greater than the threshold of directly pre-empting the
second technology. The feasibility of skipping the first technology to pre-empt the second one
can be quantified by comparing the relative value of the two strategies, i.e., Φ˜n`2 (E)/F
f
0,1(E),
to provide evidence relative to Hypothesis 4.
7. Numerical Examples
Compulsive strategy
For the numerical examples, the parameter values are µ = 0.01, ρ = r = 0.08, σ ∈ [0.1, 0.25],
γ ∈ [0.7, 1.3], I1 = 500, I2 = 1500, D1 = 8, D2 = 15, D1 = 12, D2 = 21 and λ > 0.
These values ensure that there is a trade-off between the two technologies, as in Proposition
1. Figure 7 illustrates the value function of the leader and the follower with respect to the
first technology when the second one has yet to become available (left panel), as well as the
impact of risk aversion on εm1,2, ε
p`
1,2
, εf0,1 and ε
m (right panel). According to the left panel, the
non-pre-emptive leader does not faces the risk of pre-emption and adopts the first technology
at E = 5.27. For 5.27 < E ≤ 7.88, the leader enjoys monopoly profits, yet, once the follower
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adopts the second technology at 7.88, then both firms share the market. Notice that, upon
adoption of the first technology by the follower at E = 7.88, the value function of the non-
pre-emptive leader (thin curve) is greater than that of the follower (thick curve), because the
leader holds the option to invest in the second technology first. Hence, the value function of
the non-pre-emptive leader value matches with her own value function in state 1 at E = 7.88
and not with the follower’s. In line with Hypothesis 1&2, the right panel indicates that
εf0,1 < ε
p`
1,2
< εm1,2, as shown in Proposition 3.
Figure 7: Option and project value of the leader and the follower in the first technology for γ = 0.9 (left panel)
and the follower, non-pre-emptive leader and monopolists investment thresholds (right panel) for λ = 0.1 and
σ = 0.2.
Figure 8 illustrates the impact of λ and γ on the required investment threshold of the non-
pre-emptive leader (left panel) and the follower (right panel) for σ = 0.18, 0.20. Note that, lower
γ implies greater risk aversion, which raises the required investment threshold. Furthermore,
price uncertainty increases the required investment threshold of both the leader and the follower
by raising the opportunity cost of investing, and, in turn, the value of waiting. Interestingly,
although the impact of technological uncertainty on the required investment threshold of the
follower is non-monotonic, the non-pre-emptive leader’s decision to invest is not affected by
technological uncertainty. Intuitively, the former result happens because, in view of maintaining
a compulsive strategy, greater λ increases a firm’s incentive to adopt the currently available
technology in order to have a shot at the yet unreleased version (Chronopoulos & Siddiqui,
2015). Hence, the likely arrival of a new technology raises the value of the option to invest in
the existing one, thereby mitigating the loss in the expected utility of the project due to risk
aversion. The latter result happens because the follower invests in the first technology before the
leader can adopt the second one, as shown in Proposition 3. In turn, this lowers the monopoly
profits of the leader, who has to share the first technology with the follower before adopting
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the second one. This mitigates the incentive to invest earlier in the first technology (like the
follower) when the second one is more likely to become available, thus resulting in a myopic
strategy, as stipulated in Hypothesis 3 and shown in Proposition 4. Hence, the presence of
a rival and the trade-off between the two technologies, as expressed in Proposition 1, alter the
non-pre-emptive leader’s adoption strategy relative to the monopoly case, significantly.
Figure 8: Impact of λ and γ on the optimal investment threshold of the non-pre-emptive leader (left panel) and
the follower (right panel).
The left panel of Figure 9 illustrates the impact of λ and γ on the required investment
threshold of the pre-emptive leader. Interestingly, greater λ induces later adoption for the
leader, which is in line with the accordion effect of Bouis et al. (2009). Indeed, this happens
because earlier entry of the follower due to technological uncertainty, as illustrated in the right
panel of Figure 8, reduces the period of monopoly profits for the pre-emptive leader, thereby
decreasing the attractiveness of the first technology. Hence, unlike the benchmark case of
monopoly, we observe that a higher innovation rate induces later investment for a given γ. Also,
to isolate the impact of a greater first-mover advantage with respect to the first technology, we
hold D2 fixed and find that a greater D1 lowers the required entry threshold of the pre-emptive
leader. The impact of greater first-mover advantage on the required investment threshold of
the pre-emptive leader is also illustrated in the right panel in terms of both D1 and D2. In
both cases, an increase in D1 or D2 raises the expected utility of the revenues and lowers the
required investment threshold. However, an increase in D1 has a more pronounced impact on
the required investment threshold due to the effect of discounting.
In order to determine the leader’s relative loss in value due to the follower’s entry, we use
the follower’s analysis from Section 5.1. Note that the value of the monopolist’s option to
invest in the first technology is denoted by Fm0,1(E) = A
m
0,1E
β1 for E < Em0,1 and is obtained by
replacing Di with Di, i = 1, 2 in (25). The impact of γ and σ on the relative loss in the value
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Figure 9: Impact of λ and γ on εn`0,1 for σ = 0.18, 0.2 and D2 = 21 (left panel) and impact of D1 and D2 on ε
n`
0,1
(right panel).
of the non-pre-emptive and pre-emptive leader is indicated in the left- and the right-hand side
expression of (45), respectively, and is illustrated in Figure 10.
Am0,1ε
n`
0,1
β1 −Ap`0,1εn`0,1β1
Am0,1ε
n`
0,1
β1
and
Am0,1ε
n`
0,1
β1 − Φn`1 (εn`0,1)
Am0,1ε
n`
0,1
β1
(45)
The left panel in Figure 10 indicates that the impact of price uncertainty on the relative loss in
the value of the non-pre-emptive leader is ambiguous and depends critically on the discrepancy
in market share. Specifically, the overall impact of σ on the relative loss in the leader’s value is
twofold, as a higher σ: i. postpones the entry of the follower and raises the period of monopoly
profits for the leader; and ii. entails a higher expected loss for the leader at the point when the
follower enters the market. The latter effect is more pronounced as the discrepancy in market
share increases. As the left panel indicates, when price uncertainty is low a higher σ raises
the relative loss in the leader’s value for both values of D1, since the latter effect dominates.
However, for higher levels of price uncertainty, the impact of σ on the leader’s relative loss
in value depends on the discrepancy in market share. Indeed, for D1 = 13 the latter effect
dominates, since the follower’s entry entails a greater loss for the leader’s value despite the
delayed entry. However, if the discrepancy in market share is low, i.e. D1 = 12, then the
leader’s loss in value is not as pronounced and is thus offset by the extra value due to the
followers delayed entry. Similarly, as the right panel illustrates, greater price uncertainty and a
lower first-mover advantage decreases the relative loss in value for the pre-emptive leader.
The impact of γ and λ on the relative loss in value for the non-pre-emptive (left panel) and
pre-emptive leader (right panel) is illustrated in Figure 11. As both panels illustrate, a higher
innovation rate lowers the relative loss in the value of the leader by raising the expected utility
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Figure 10: Relative loss in the value of the non-pre-emptive (left panel) and pre-emptive leader (right panel)
versus γ and σ for λ = 0.1 and D2 = 21.
of the embedded option to adopt an improved technology version. Interestingly, risk aversion
has an ambiguous impact on the relative loss in the value of the leader. More specifically, under
a low (high) rate of innovation, greater risk aversion decreases (increases) the relative loss in
the value of the leader. This happens because greater risk aversion postpones the entry of the
follower and allows the leader to enjoy monopoly profits for a longer time. However, when λ is
high, the second technology is more likely to become available, which gives the leader a greater
incentive to invest relative to the monopolist, as shown in Proposition 3. Consequently, like the
impact of price uncertainty on the leader’s relative loss in value, the likely arrival of the second
technology makes the impact of the follower’s entry more pronounced in terms of the loss in
value it entails for the leader.
Figure 11: Relative loss in the value of the non-pre-emptive (left panel) and pre-emptive leader (right panel)
versus γ and λ for D2 = 21.
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Leapfrog Strategy
The left panel in Figure 12 illustrates the feasibility of the leapfrog strategy for D1 = 9, D2 = 30
and σ = 0.3, 0.5, by identifying the range of values of γ for which the pre-emption threshold of
the compulsive leader is greater than the threshold of directly adopting the second technology,
i.e. ε˜n`0,2 < ε
n`
1,2
. Note that the range of γ for which the leapfrog strategy is feasible increases
with lower price uncertainty, which provides evidence in support of Hypothesis 4. Intuitively,
a less volatile economic environment mitigates the implication of risk aversion by reducing the
reluctance to skip the first technology in order to pre-empt the second one. Also, the right
panel illustrates the relative value (RV ) of skipping the first technology to pre-empt the second
technology directly, which is described in (46), under a low and a high output price. Here, we
ignore technological uncertainty by assuming that both technologies are available.
RV =
Φ˜n`2 (E)
F f0,1 (E)
(46)
Note that if the output price is low, then it is always better to be a compulsive follower (two
bottom lines). This is in contrast to Huisman & Kort (2004), who find that only the final
technology will be adopted when it is likely to become available, whereas in our case a compulsive
strategy may be optimal for low output prices due to the trade-off between the two technologies
(Proposition 1). However, under a high output price (two top lines), increasing price uncertainty
makes it optimal to skip the first technology in order to pre-empt the second one, while lower risk
aversion also increases the relative value of pre-empting the second technology. Interestingly,
however, even under risk aversion it may be optimal to ignore the first technology and pre-empt
the second one directly, provided that price uncertainty is adequately high. Note that this result
is in line with Kort et al. (2010), who show how the value of stepwise investment decreases with
greater economic uncertainty relative to a lumpy investment strategy. However, unlike Kort et
al. (2010), we do not assume that stepwise investment is associated with an investment cost
premium.
8. Conclusions
We analyse how risk aversion interacts with price and technological uncertainty to impact
sequential green investment decisions under duopolistic competition. The analysis is motivated
by four main features of the modern economic environment: i. increasing competition due to
the deregulation of many industries; ii. market incompleteness and attitudes towards risk; iii.
the sequential nature of investment decisions in emerging technologies, e.g. energy and R&D;
and iv. increasing rate of technological innovation/obsolescence. We incorporate these features
into a utility-based, real options framework for duopolistic competition, where two identical
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Figure 12: Pre-emption investment thresholds under compulsive and directly adopting the second technology
(left panel), and relative value of the leapfrog strategy compared to the compulsive strategy for the follower
evaluated at E = ε˜n`0,2 and E = ε
f
0,2 (right panel).
firms compete in the sequential adoption of technological innovations. Specifically, we assume
that the firms compete in the adoption of two technologies, of which the first is available, while
the arrival of the second, more improved version, is subject to technological uncertainty.
Results indicate that insights from traditional real options models do not extend naturally to
a competitive setting with interacting uncertainties and risk aversion. We find that technological
uncertainty increases the follower’s incentive to adopt the existing technology. This is in line
with Chronopoulos & Siddiqui (2015), who address sequential investment under technological
uncertainty, ignoring however strategic interactions and risk aversion. Interestingly, we also
show that the non-pre-emptive leader’s optimal investment threshold in the existing technology
is independent of technological uncertainty and the same as the monopolist’s (Hypothesis 3).
This result is also shown in Siddiqui & Takashima (2012), however, it is derived here within a
more general context and reflects the interaction between two opposing forces: i. the incentive
for earlier investment due to technological uncertainty (Chronopoulos & Siddiqui, 2015) and
ii. the loss in value due to the follower’s adoption of the first technology before the leader can
adopt the second one. Hence, the leader’s loss in value due to the follower’s earlier investment
mitigates the increase in option value implied by the likely arrival of the second technology.
In addition, we show how technological uncertainty delays the entry of the pre-emptive leader
and that competition induces earlier adoption of the second technology by the non-pre-emptive
leader relative to the monopolist (Hypothesis 1&2).
Furthermore, we find that, although greater price uncertainty lowers the relative loss in the
value of the pre-emptive leader, the impact of price uncertainty on the relative loss in the non-
pre-emptive leader’s option value depends crucially on the discrepancy in market share. Also, a
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higher innovation rate lowers the relative loss in the value of both the non-pre-emptive and the
pre-emptive leader. With respect to the technology adoption strategy, we show how the threat
of pre-emption creates an incentive to ignore the existing technology in order to adopt the new
one directly, and we identify when this strategy dominates under different levels of economic
uncertainty and risk aversion (Hypothesis 4).
Extensions in the same line of work may include the flexibility to choose both the time of
investment and the size of the project. In line with Huisman & Kort (2015), this will also
enable the analysis of how strategic interactions impact social welfare in terms of the time
of investment and the amount of installed capacity. Additionally, regulatory risk regarding
the availability of subsidies for specific technologies may also be included, as it may impact
strategic interactions significantly. Other technology adoption strategies may also be analysed
as in Grenadier & Weiss (1997), or asymmetries can be included to analyse non-pre-emptive
duopoly as in Takashima et al. (2008). Also, our framework may be extended by explicitly
modelling the expected delay between the leader’s investment decision and the time of that the
knowledge spillover takes place, as in Femminis & Martini (2011). Finally, it would interesting
to explore the robustness of the analytical and numerical results by allowing the subjective and
the risk-free discount rate to differ, by applying an alternative stochastic process, such as a
GBM with mean-reversion, or by applying a different utility function.
Acknowledgements: The authors are grateful for the support from the Research Council of Norway
through project 268093 and 274569.
Appendix
A. Compulsive Strategy
Each firm’s risk preferences are described by the functional U(·), indicated in (A–1), denoting
an increasing and concave utility function.
E 7−→
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtU (Et) dt (A–1)
By applying Theorem 9.18 of Karatzas & Shreve (1999) for the HARA utility function described
in (2), we obtain (A–2)
EE
[∫ ∞
0
e−ρtU (Et) dt
]
=
2
σ2(β1 − β2)
[
Eβ2
∫ E
0
xγ
γ
x−β2−1dx+ Eβ1
∫ ∞
E
xγ
γ
x−β1−1dx
]
= ΥU(E) (A–2)
where Υ = β1β2ρ(β1−γ)(β2−γ) and β1β2 = −
2ρ
σ2
.
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Proof of Proposition 1: The expected utility of the profits from operating the first and the
second technology is described in (A–3) and (A–4), respectively.
Φab1 (E) = ΥU (D1E)−
U (rI1)
ρ
(A–3)
Φab2 (E) = ΥU (D2E)−
U(rI2) + U(rI1)
ρ
(A–4)
Let ε denote the indifference point between the two projects, i.e. the point of intersection of
the NPVs of the two projects. First, note that U(DiE) = D
γ
i U(E), which implies that the U(·)
is homogeneous of degree γ. Also, Φabi (E) is C1, ddEΦabi (E) > 0, i = 1, 2 and
d
dE
Φabi (E) = γΥD
γ
1U (E) /E < γΥD
γ
2U (E) /E =
d
dE
Φab2 (E), ∀E > 0. (A–5)
Consequently, ∃!ε : Φab1 (ε) = Φab2 (ε). The expression of ε is described in (A–6).
Φab1 (ε) = Φ
ab
2 (ε) ⇒ ε =
(
γU(rI2)
Υρ (Dγ2 −Dγ1 )
) 1
γ
(A–6)
A trade-off between the technologies requires that Φabi (ε) > 0, i = 1, 2.
Φab1 (ε) > 0⇒ ΥU (D1ε)−
U (rI1)
ρ
> 0⇒ D
γ
1
Iγ1
>
Dγ2
Iγ1 + I
γ
2
(A–7)

Proof of Proposition 2: The expected utility of the perpetual stream of profits from operating
the second technology is described in (A–8)
Φf2(E) = ΥU (ED2)−
U (rI1) + U (rI2)
ρ
(A–8)
and the value function of the follower in state (1, 2) is indicated in (A–9).
F f1,2 (E) =

[U (ED1)− U (rI1)] dt+ e−ρdtEE
[
F f1,2(E + dE)
]
, E < εf1,2
Φf2(E) , E ≥ εf1,2
(A–9)
By expanding the top part on the right-hand side of (A–9) using Itoˆ’s lemma, we obtain the
ODE (A–10), where L = 12σ2E2 d
2
dE2
+ µE ddE is the differential generator
[L − ρ]F f1,2(E) + U (ED1)− U (rI1) = 0 (A–10)
and, solving (A–10), we obtain (A–11).
F f1,2(E) = ΥU (ED1)−
U (rI1)
ρ
+Af1,2E
β1 + Cf1,2E
β2 , E < εf1,2 (A–11)
Note that β2 < 0 ⇒ Cf1,2Eβ2 → ∞ as E → 0. Hence, we must have Cf1,2 = 0. Also, Af1,2
and εf1,2 are obtained via the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions between the two
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branches of (14) that are described in (A–12) and (A–13), respectively.
ΥU (ED1)−
U (rI1)
ρ
+Af1,2E
β1
∣∣∣∣
E=εf1,2
= Φf2(E)
∣∣∣∣
E=εf1,2
(A–12)
d
dE
ΥU (ED1)−
U (rI1)
ρ
+Af1,2E
β1
∣∣∣∣
E=εf1,2
=
d
dE
Φf2(E)
∣∣∣∣
E=εf1,2
(A–13)
Thus, the follower’s value function in state (1, 2) is described in (15). 
Proof of Proposition 3: From Chronopoulos & Siddiqui (2015), we know that uncertainty
in the arrival of a new technology increases a firm’s incentive to invest in the existing one.
Therefore, we denote by εf0,1 the follower’s maximum critical threshold taken over all possible
values of λ, i.e. εf0,1 = max
{
εf0,1 : λ ∈ [0,∞)
}
. This is indicated in (A–14).
εf0,1 =
rI1
D1
[
β2 − γ
β2
] 1
γ
(A–14)
Also, the follower’s optimal investment threshold in the second technology, εp`
1,2
, is indicated in
in (A–15).
εp`
1,2
= rI2
 β2 − γ
β2
(
Dγ2 −Dγ1
)
 1γ (A–15)
Consequently,
εp`
1,2
> εf0,1 ⇔ rI2
(
β2 − γ
β2
) 1
γ
(
1
Dγ2 −Dγ1
) 1
γ
>
rI1
D
1
(
β2 − γ
β2
) 1
γ
⇔ Dγ
1
Iγ2 > I
γ
1
(
Dγ2 −Dγ1
)
⇔ D
γ
1
Iγ1
>
Dγ2
Iγ1 + I
γ
2
(A–16)
which holds due to Proposition 1. Therefore, εp`
1,2
> εf0,1 > ε
f
0,1, ∀λ ∈ [0,∞).
Next, because the only difference between a monopolist and a follower is the demand co-
efficient, we can use (19) to determine εm1,2 by replacing Di with Di, i = 1, 2. Based on the
analytical expression of εp`
1,2
and εm1,2, we obtain (A–17), which holds because D1 > D1.
εp`
1,2
= rI2
 β2 − γ
β2
(
Dγ2 −Dγ1
)
 1γ < rI2
 β2 − γ
β2
(
Dγ2 −Dγ1
)
 1γ = εm1,2 (A–17)

Proof of Proposition 4: The leader’s option to invest in the first technology can alternatively
be expressed as in (A–18). This formulation enables the further investigation on the impact of
λ on the optimal investment threshold.
F p`0,1(E) = max
Ep`0,1>E
(
E
Ep`0,1
)β1 [
ΥU
(
Ep`0,1D1
)
− U (rI1)
ρ
+Ap`1 E
p`β1
0,1
]
(A–18)
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Note that technological uncertainty, reflected in λ, is embedded in Ap`1 . However, from Propo-
sition 1 and Proposition 3, we know that εf0,1 < ε
p`
1,2
, i.e. the non-pre-emptive leader cannot
adopt the second technology before the follower adopts the first one. This implies that at the
follower’s optimal investment threshold, εf0,1, we have Φ
p`
1
(
εf0,1
)
= Φp`
1
(
εf0,1
)
. This condition
reduces the degrees of freedom of Ap`1 to zero and yields the expression (A–19). Consequently,
d
dEA
p`
1 = 0.
Ap`1 =
(
1
εf0,1
)β1 [
ΥU
(
εf0,1
) [
Dγ
1
−Dγ1
]
+Ap`
1,2
εf
β1
0,1 +A
p`
1
εf
δ1
0,1
]
(A–19)
Next, the unconstrained optimisation problem (A–18) is solved by applying the FONC to
(A–18) with respect to Ep`0,1 and the optimal investment rule is outlined in (A–20). The left-
hand side of (A–20) can be interpreted as the marginal benefit (MB) of delaying investment
and the right-hand side as the corresponding marginal cost (MC). Specifically, the first term
on the left-hand side reflects the extra benefit from allowing the project to start at a higher
price threshold and the second term is the increase in MB form postponing the investment cost.
Similarly, the first term on the right-hand side represents the opportunity cost of forgone cash
flows. The third term on the left-hand side represents the MB of postponing the loss in value
due to the follower’s entry, and the second term on the right-hand side is the MC from waiting,
thereby incurring a greater loss in value when the follower enters.
γΥU
(
D1
)
εp`0,1
γ−1
+
β1U (rI1)
εp`0,1ρ
− β1Ap`1 εp`0,1
β1−1
= β1ΥU
(
D1
)
εp`0,1
γ−1 − β1Ap`1 εp`0,1
β1−1
(A–20)
The third and second term on the left- and right-hand side of (A–21) cancel and the optimal
investment threshold is obtained analytically as indicated in (A–21).
εp`0,1 =
rI1
D1
[
β2 − γ
β2
] 1
γ
and Ap`0,1 =
(
1
εp`0,1
)β1
Φp`1
(
εp`0,1
)
(A–21)

Pre-emptive Leader
In state 2, the value function of the leader, described in (28), value-matches with the bottom
part of the follower’s value function, described in (15), at εf1,2, because for E ≥ εf1,2 the two firms
share the market. Thus, the expected reduction due to the follower’s entry can be determined
from (A–22).
Φp`2
(
εf1,2
)
= Φf2
(
εf1,2
)
⇒
(
E
εf1,2
)β1
ΥU
(
εf1,2
) [
Dγ
2
−Dγ2
]
(A–22)
Analogously, in state 1, the discounted change in project value is obtained by value matching
(33) with the top branch in (32) at εf0,1. Hence, A
p`
1 can be determined from (A–23).
Φp`1
(
εf0,1
)
= Φp`
1
(
εf0,1
)
⇒
(
E
εf0,1
)β1 [
ΥU
(
εf0,1
) [
Dγ
1
−Dγ1
]
+Ap`
1,2
εf
β1
0,1 +A
p`
1
εf
δ1
0,1
]
(A–23)
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In terms of the first technology, specifically in state 1, the value function of the leader is obtained
by solving (38) and the solution is indicated in (A–24).
Φn`
1
(E)=

Λ
[
λΥU
(
ED2
)
+ U (ED1¯)
]− U(rI1)ρ − λU(rI2)ρ(ρ+λ) +Ap`2 Eβ1 +An`1 Eδ1 , E < εf1,2
Λ [λΥU (ED2) + U (ED1¯)]− U(rI1)ρ − λU(rI2)ρ(ρ+λ) , E ≥ εf1,2
(A–24)

Proof of Proposition 5: Ideally, the leader would invest at the threshold that maximises her
expected utility, i.e. at εp`
1,2
. However, the threat of pre-emption lowers the adoption threshold
to εn`
1,2
. The price threshold at which the firm is indifferent between being the leader or the fol-
lower is defined implicitly via the condition F f1,2 (E) = Φ
n`
2 (E). Given that the follower adopts
a compulsive strategy, there are two possible scenarios: i. εf0,1 > ε
n`
1,2
and ii. εf0,1 < ε
n`
1,2
. In
the former scenario, the threat of pre-emption is eliminated, however, in the latter the threat
still exists. If εf0,1 > ε
n`
1,2
, then the leader will invest at εf0,1, because F
n`
1,2
(
εf0,1
)
> Fn`
1,2
(
εn`
1,2
)
.
By contrast, if εf0,1 < ε
n`
1,2
, then the leader will have to pre-empt the first technology at εn`
1,2
.
Consequently, the optimal investment threshold is max
{
εf0,1, ε
n`
1,2
}
. 
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